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Abstract
As a consequence of the rapid and significative decrease in domestic demand, to avoid structural surplus traditional wine producing 
countries have been forced to export a growing share of their wine production. This article empirically investigates Argentinean trade 
policy on the wine sector over the last years, in order to understand its effect on export flows. An expanded gravity model was estimated 
through a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator, in order to account for heteroskedasticity. The data used refer to Argentinean 
exports of bottled wine to all main world importers during the period 1997-2010, and account for more than 90% of total trade flows. 
Our results show that Mercosur membership has promoted Argentinean wine exports to other Latin American countries, but may as a 
whole have been counter-productive. A more open trade policy could increase Argentinean bottled wine exports by more than 5.8%. In 
addition, given the rise in wine imports and consumption in countries with high tariff barriers, such as China, the small number of free 
trade agreements could penalize Argentinean exports even more in the future.
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The world wine industry has experienced great 
changes in the last decades, mainly driven by the drop 
of consumption per capita in traditional producing 
countries and the growth of consumption in emerging 
markets (Dal Bianco et al., 2016). In addition, the 
premium wine sector has expanded significantly to the 
detriment of ordinary wines (Cembalo et al., 2014). 
These factors have defined a new world scenario 
dominated by trade. New world countries (NWC) 
have enjoyed an important export-led growth, while 
for traditional European producers exports have 
supported the industry, avoiding persistent surplus 
(Anderson, 2004). Indeed, Spain, Italy and France, the 
three countries with the biggest wine production and 
oenological tradition, account for almost half of world 
production but only a third of world consumption. This 
has pushed these countries towards the export business 
and, in the global scenario, this has meant an increase in 
the export-consumption ratio (Anderson, 2004). While 
only 23.7% of world wine consumption was of imported 
wine in 1997, the ratio has risen to 43.1% in 2015. The 
new wine trade geography has also been driven by new 
exporting and importing countries. Indeed, only 16% 
of total wine exports originated from NWC in 1997, 
whereas these countries accounted for 30% of all 
wine exports in 2015. These factors have contributed 
to making wine a globalized beverage (Anderson & 
Nelgen, 2011; Dal Bianco et al., 2013). Aizenman & 
Brooks (2008) suggest additional elements that should 
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be taken into account when analysing wine exports, 
as this globalization could be the result of a larger 
phenomenon, connected to an increase in migration 
and tourist flows, mass communication and a revolution 
able to generate a new collective cultural identity. 
This globalization process has also been enhanced by 
world trade policy. Since 1994 – through the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) – there has been a gradual 
tariff reduction for all products, and in particular for 
agricultural products. Lastly, countless free trade 
agreements (FTAs) have been signed and wine has been 
an important item in most of them (Dal Bianco et al., 
2016). 
In this context, Argentinean wine exports have grown 
incredibly during the period 2000-2015, with a fivefold 
increase in value and almost a threefold increase in 
terms of volume. This has led to total exports reaching 
a turnover of 817 million US$ and 2,701 thousand 
hectolitres in 2015. In terms of tariff barriers, despite 
taking advantage of the reduction in most favoured 
nation duty (MFN) imposed by the WTO, the country 
has signed few trade agreements, so being at a possible 
disadvantage against its main competitors. The 
unreceptive attitude of the Mercosur Union1 towards 
trade agreements may be an important weakness for 
all industries wishing to broad their horizons. Indeed 
FTAs have proved to be one of the main resources to 
lower import duties and boost bilateral trade, which is 
sometimes doubled between signatory countries (Baier 
& Bergstrand, 2009). The intense competition in the 
world wine industry necessitates a better understanding 
of the role of customs duties in the wine trade, as 
well as other factors that could influence exports. The 
Argentinean case study is of particular interest since 
Argentina’s exports are not explained exclusively by 
increased international demand. Indeed, its primary 
scope is to reduce surplus deriving from the fall in 
domestic consumption, like in European countries 
(Gennari et al., 2013). In addition, like other NWC, 
Argentina is conducting an aggressive marketing policy 
worldwide to promote its wine2, but this is not backed 
up by an appropriate trade policy aiming to increase 
competitiveness through decreased transaction costs. 
In fact, among the biggest wine producers, Argentina 
is not just the country that signed the fewest FTAs, but 
also the only nation that has imposed a tax on exports 
of domestic production (5%).
The Argentinean wine industry has experienced great 
changes in its structure since the beginning of 1990s. 
Indeed, despite wine production having remained quite 
stable over time, the reorganization of the sector with an 
improvement of cultivation techniques and oenological 
processes has led to a notable increase in wine quality. 
The main indicator of this quality improvement is 
the average FOB3 price of Argentinean bottled wine 
exports that has more than doubled since the beginning 
of this century (from 1.77 to 3.83 US$/L). Argentinean 
wine has gradually improved its reputation and exports 
have gradually increased accounting for 21% of total 
production by 2015 (in 2000 it was just 7.7%)4. This 
is only partially due to the expansion of international 
trade; the increase in wine quality and improvement in 
winery organization have also played a fundamental 
role. The result is that total wine exports have increased 
178.5% in volume in the period 2000-2015 – against 
an overall world increase of 47.5% – reaching in 2015 
a quantity of 2,701,507 hL (817.4 million US$). The 
average price of exported wines5 has also risen, in 
recognition of improved wine quality. Indeed, at the 
beginning of the considered period, unit price was 
less than 1 US$/L, while since 2015 the average price 
has steadily been above 3.00 US$/L. Furthermore, the 
number of exporting wineries has more than tripled, 
from 139 in 2003 to more than 380 in 2009. Brands 
have also enjoyed great dynamism in their attempt to 
profit from Argentinean success on the international 
markets. 
However, Argentina’s performance is far behind 
the average of NWC in terms of exported quantities. 
In fact, in the long term, Argentinean export growth, 
with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.5%, 
is ranked in the middle between the OWC and other 
NWC (CAGR of 0.8% and 6.6%, respectively)6. This 
could be explained by the fact that, among NWC, the 
Argentinean wine sector and domestic consumption 
patterns are the most similar to those in European 
countries. In addition, Argentina, as a member of 
Mercosur, did not implement any economic policy 
aimed to actively develop international trade in the last 
20 years. Indeed, Argentina has only signed four FTAs, 
1 Mercosur union comprises Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and more recently Venezuela, as full members.
2 The main marketing policy enacted by Argentina is the one operating through Wines of Argentina. This non-profit organization is integrated by win-
eries accounting for more than 95% of exports and also receives money from the state government. With an annual budget of 4.5 million US$ in 2016, it 
promotes consumption of Argentinean wines all over the world.
3 Free on Board.
4 According to Global Trade Atlas (GTA) and Organisation Internationale de la Vigne et du Vin (OIV) data, export volume was 97,014,130 L in 2000 and 
270,150,731 L in 2015, production was 12,537,000 hL in 2000 and the forecast for 2015 is 13,100,000 hL.
5 Including bottled, sparkling and bulk wines.
6 Referred to the period 1997-2015. Old World countries comprise Italy, France, Spain, Germany, Portugal. New World Countries comprise Australia, 
Chile, USA, Argentina, South Africa, New Zealand. Data source: Global Trade Atlas (http://gtalogin.com/).
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a low number if compared with its main wine export 
competitors, such as the EU (36), Chile (25), Australia 
(11) and New Zealand (10), but also more generally in 
comparison with other main world economies (Table 
1). The low propensity for trade can be evaluated by 
looking at the number of  FTAs signed over time. Indeed, 
most countries signed the majority of agreements in the 
last decade, while Argentina signed three of its four 
agreements before 1995. Then, after joining Mercosur 
in 1991 (it was the third FTA signed), Argentina lost the 
possibility of signing any FTA on its own, being bound 
to Mercosur foreign policy. Indeed, the FTA signed by 
Argentina in the last ten years, has in fact been signed 
by the Mercosur union, and apply to all its members. 
In addition, the lack of openness towards international 
trade is also proved by the fact that, as mentioned 
previously, Argentina is the only major wine producer to 
have imposed a tax (of 5%) on the value of exported wines.
In terms of wine categories, more than half of 
Argentinean wine exports are of bottled wine, included 
in customs code 220421 “wine of fresh grapes in 
containers holding not more than 2 litres” (Table 2)7. 
Bulk wine also accounts for a big part of total exports 
and has increased its share, as happened in other NWC, 
particularly in Australia8. Sparkling wine has a small 
share of total exports. This is not surprising since 
Argentinean sparkling wine production is relatively 
small and has only increased in the last years, mainly 
for domestic consumption9.
The analysis of export concentration, estimated by the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index10 (HHI), can contribute 
to a better understanding of the situation. A low value 
of HHI indicates that the exporting country is trading 
with several partners with a relatively low market share 
each. Whereas a high HHI indicates that exports are 
concentrated in few partners. In the analysed period, 
the overall HHI index for Argentinean wine exports (in 
volume) increased from 0.10 to 0.12. This change is 
mainly explained by the increase in share of bulk wine 
on total exports (up to 38.3% from 32.7%). Since bulk 
wine export is focused towards a few big importers (HHI 
for bulk wine is 0.25), an increase in bulk wine share 
of exports directly increases the overall HHI index. 
Instead, for bottled wine and especially for sparkling 
wine, a market diversification process was verified. This 
is not surprising since sparkling wine is a relatively new 
product for the Argentinean wine industry, requiring 
Table 1. Number of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) signed by country
Total number 
of FTAs
Number of FTAs signed over time
Before 1995 1995-2004 2005-2014 [1]
Argentina[2] 4 3 0 1
European Union 36 6 14 16
Chile 25 3 8 14
Australia 11 4 1 7
New Zealand 10 2 1 6
USA 14 1 3 11
Canada 11 1 3 7
Russia 17 11 2 4
Japan 14 0 1 13
China 13 1 3 9
[1]Including the first two months of 2015. [2]Include the Mercosur-India FTA of 2009. 
Source: own elaboration from WTO RTA database (http://rtais.wto.org/UI/Public-
MaintainRTAHome.aspx).






Bottled 66.5 0.14 60.6 0.10
Bulk 32.7 0.25 38.3 0.25
Sparkling 0.8 0.24 1.1 0.11
Total 100 0.10 100 0.12
Source: Own elaboration from GTA database (http://gtalogin.
com/).
7 Wine is exported through three different HS 6-digit codes: 220410, that refers to sparkling wine, 220421, referring to still and semi-sparkling bottled 
wine, and 220429 that comprises wine exported in containers holding more than two litres.
8 Bulk wine export share in Australia increased from 12.5% in 2000 to 55.9% in 2015.
9  According to the Instituto Nacional de Vitivinicultura (INV), Argentinean sparkling wine production increased by 160% in ten years, reaching a volume 
of 346,864 hLin 2012, which represents 2.9% of total domestic production. In the same year, Argentinean sparkling wine exports accounted for 41,586 
hL (12.0% of production).
10 The index was developed by the economists Hirschman (1945) and Herfindahl (1950). The index is defined as the sum of the squares of the market 
shares of the 50 largest firms. In our case we modified the index using market share of importing countries.
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the development of intense promotional efforts. In 
particular, the sparkling wine HHI index suggests that 
wineries are selling this new product together with 
their “traditional” products, integrating their portfolios. 
All in all, the analysis of HHI indexes shows that 
bulk wine exports are concentrated in a few countries, 
while bottled and sparkling wine are enjoying a market 
diversification process. 
Basically, the decrease of HHI index in bottled and 
sparkling wines is due to the market export shift (in 
relative terms) from EU and South American countries 
(in particular Paraguay) to North America. Indeed, 
since 2004, the main destination for all wines exported 
was the USA. In terms of both value and volume, more 
than 40% of all exports were sent to this market in 
2012. Despite a decrease in the HHI, a reduced market 
diversity is still a characteristic of Argentinean exports 
throughout the decade. The five main destinations for 
bottled wine accounted for 52% of all litres exported 
in 2010, rising to 70% in 2012. In value the five main 
countries were the destination for 54% of all exports, 
while in 2012 more than two thirds were exported to 
five countries. Although the main importing markets 
have changed over time, high concentration remains the 
main characteristic of Argentinean wine exports. Table 
3 shows the evolution of Argentinean bottled wine 
exports by region, it is worth noting that North America 
almost doubled its share in the period 2000-2012, with 
an 11-fold increase in imported value. Instead Europe, 
which was the main importer in 2000 with a share of 
45.8%, shows the lower increase rate, and, if these 
trends remain stable, it will be overtaken by other Latin 
American countries in few years.
Although wine consumption is becoming more 
uniform across world and new markets are emerging, 
the trends of Argentinean wine exports seem not to be 
driven just by demand. In our work we focused on the 
role of tariffs as a trade restriction, since they could in 
particular affect trade with EU and Asia, which have 
relatively high import duties. Table 4 shows the tariff 
barriers faced by Argentinean bottled wine exports, 
depicting the degree of commercial openness towards 
a selected group of countries, and its evolution in the 
period 1998-2010. Specifically, due to the WTO efforts, 
the average tariff barrier has been reduced by 62%, 
decreasing from 9.61% in 1998 to 3.63% in 2010. 
Despite this, there are still some interesting differences 
between regions and countries. In particular, North 
American countries have the lowest tariffs, while 
Asian countries have the highest, denoting a different 
approach towards international flows and especially 
towards wine flows. It is worth noting that the average 
import tariff in 2010 was lower than the national tax on 
the value of exported wines (3.63% against 5%).
In this context, preferential trade agreements could 
play a strategic role in determining export dynamics 
and geography of trade. The objective of this paper 
was to understand the impact of the Argentinean and 
Mercosur trade policy on wine exports. To achieve 
this, the structure of Argentinean wine exports, their 
evolution and the tariff barriers applied in selected 
markets was analysed first. Secondly the impact of 
those tariff barriers on the international wine trade was 
assessed empirically through a gravity model. 
Material and methods
Methodology
The estimation of international trade flows based on 
the gravity model can be traced to Tinbergen (1962) 
who first studied import and export flows applying a 
gravity equation. Even if since the beginning the model 
has generated interesting empirical results, it was only 
some years later that Anderson (1979) formulated the 
theoretical basis for this application. The theory explains 
that not only economic size influences the volume of 
trade, but also bilateral barriers affect commercial flows. 
Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) extended this concept 
Table 3. Evolution of bottled wine exports by region (HS 220421)
Region
Thousand US$ Share (%) CAGR[1]
2000 2007 2012 2000 2007 2012 2000-07 2007-12 2000-12
North America 32,395 144,020 354,392 25.9 34.3 47.9 34.8 19.7 22.1
EU 57,336 143,732 168,725 45.8 34.2 22.8 20.2 3.3 9.4
Latin America 30,430 96,783 146,479 24.3 23.0 19.8 26.0 8.6 14.0
Asia 4,203 16,734 47,633 3.4 4.0 6.4 31.8 23.3 22.4
East Europe 391 11,126 10,095 0.3 2.6 1.4 95.4 -1.9 31.1
Others 550 7,665 11,835 0.4 1.8 1.6 69.4 9.1 29.2
Total 125,305 420,060 739,159 100 100 100 27.4 12.0 15.9
[1]CAGR: compound average growth rate.  Source: own elaboration from GTA database (http://gtalogin.com/)
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introducing the concept of “multilateral resistance” that 
refers to the average trade barrier that should be taken 
into account to correctly specify the gravity equation. 
The variables commonly included in the gravity model 
for an estimation of international flows are: distance 
(Disdier & Head, 2008), shared borders (McCallum, 
1995), tariffs (Baier & Bergstrand, 2001), technical 
barriers (Maskus et al., 2000) and fixed costs for trade 
(Helpman et al., 2008). In McCallum’s work (1995), 
one of the most relevant papers assessing the role of 
national borders using a gravity approach, international 
trade flows are estimated as a function of each country’s 
output, the reciprocal distance and presence or absence 
of a shared border. The gravity model has been also used 
specifically for wine, investigating the determinants of 
trade within the EU (Dascal et al., 2002), and the role 
of trade policies (Pinilla & Serrano, 2008), wine quality 
(Seccia et al., 2009), geographical indications (Agostino 
& Trivieri, 2014), tariffs and non-tariff barriers (Dal 
Bianco et al., 2016).
In our work we tried to assess how customs duties 
affect Argentinean wine exports, also estimating the gain 
deriving from a more open trade policy. Other scholars 
have used the gravity equation to estimate the effect of 
trade barriers on international trade. Olper & Raimondi 
(2008) found that policy issues, the cost of information 
and cultural similarity play a key role in explaining 
the impact of borders on trade flows. Moreover, the 
authors found that almost one third of trade reduction 
can be explained by the existence of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers. Three years later, Raimondi & Olper 
(2011) employed a gravity model to understand the 
effect of tariffs reduction on 18 agricultural sectors, 
both in developed and developing countries. Applying 
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model of 
monopolistic competition (Krugman, 1980) together 
with a complete set of international asymmetries (Lai & 
Chun Zhu, 2004) the authors estimated the elasticity of 
substitution of different countries’ exports. Their results 
suggest that countries with high gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita would benefit more from the reduction 
of trade frictions (both tariffs and non-tariff barriers). 
Our empirical model follows the above literature and 
adopts a standard CES specification. It accounts for the 
most common variables included in the gravity equation 
(GDP, distance, language), but also explores the role 
of national regulations (through tariffs) and importers 
wine production as a repulsive force to imports. 






(millions U$D) Tariff applied 
[1] Export
(million U$D) Tariff applied 
[1]
USA 18.9 3.38 223.3 1.55 1083.8 -54.1
EU [2] 32.5 6.00 142.4 5.94 337.8 -1.0
Canada 2.8 3.92 83.8 1.08 2928.6 -72.5
Brazil 2.6 23.00 53.1 0.00 1956.4 -100.0
Paraguay 17.0 4.60 28.9 0.00 70.1 -100.0
Mexico 0.6 20.00 15.0 20.00 2562.7 0.0
Switzerland 2.7 6.90 12.9 10.85 386.4 57.3
China 0.2 65.00 9.7 14.00 4808.4 -78.5
Peru 1.1 12.00 9.3 8.10 750.3 -32.5
Japan 14.4 29.23 8.8 28.10 -39.1 -3.9
Colombia 0.3 20.00 7.6 0.00 2514.3 -100.0
Uruguay 5.3 9.00 4.9 0.00 -7.9 -100.0
Chile 4.9 11.00 1.6 1.00 -66.2 -90.9
Australia 0.0 5.00 0.9 5.00 6626.3 0.0
Total [3] 103.1 9.61 602.1 3.63 483.8 -62.2
[1]For countries with different tariff lines under HS6 code, the weighted average was taken of the various tariffs applied. [2]Weighted 
average of main EU partner: UK, Italy, France, Spain, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland. [3]Weighted aver-
age of importing countries considered in this study.  Source: own elaboration of data collected from World Integrated Trade Solution 
(http://wits.worldbank.org/), World Trade Organization (https://www.wto.org/), and national customs offices (https://www.cbp.gov/; 
http://madb.europa.eu/madb/euTariffs.htm; http://www.sat.gob.mx/Paginas/Inicio.aspx; http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/; https://www.ezv.
admin.ch/ezv/en/home.html; http://english.customs.gov.cn/; http://www.customs.go.jp/english/; http://www.dian.gov.co/; https://www.
border.gov.au/).
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For the gravity model, the standard equation was 
used, which links trade flows to economic masses 
and distances (Tinbergen, 1962). Consensus has been 
reached on the use of countries’ GDP as a proxy for 
economic masses and physical distance as a proxy 
for distances. For a wine gravity model, according 
to Dal Bianco et al. (2016), it seems fair to add wine 
production volume as a proxy for the importer’s 
domestic supply.
The following standard CES specification was 
employed:
                           Xijt=μ Pjt
α Ijt
β Dij
*δ                                   [1]
where Xijt stands for wine trade flows from Argentina 
to country j at time t; Pit represents the importer’s 
production at time t, Ijt stands for importer’s GDP at 
time t and Dij proxies the geographical distance. After 
log-linearization the model becomes:
             lnXijt = μ
* + αlnPjt + βlnIjt + δlnDij
* + εijt     [2]
where μ* = lnμ and the additive error εijt is assumed to be 
identically and independently distributed. 
Trade resistances induced by tariffs are also 
modeled assuming a multiplicative form; in analogy 
with previous studies (Jayasinghe et al., 2010), we 
augmented geographical distance including tariffs:
                      Dijt
* = (1 + Dij) + (1 + tjt)                  [3]
where Dij
* stands for the total economic distance, 
including physical distance and trade regulations. Dij 
represents the pair-wise geographical distance between 
i and j; tj stands for the j-specific tariff in year t. After 
log-linearization the model can be expressed as follows:
Xijt = μ
* + αlnPjt + βlnIjt + δ1ln(1 + Dij) + δ2ln(1 + tjt) + εijt   [4]
where δ1 and δ2 replace the parameter δ of Eq. [1]. 
In order to control for multilateral resistance, we 
introduced importer fixed effects as an explanatory 
covariate. Eq. [4] then becomes as follows:
Xijt=μ
* + αlnPjt + βlnIjt + δ1ln(1 + Dij) + δ2ln(1 + tjt) + μj
* + εijt    [5] 
where μj
* represents the importer fixed effects. Fixed 
effects model introduces an individual specific effect. 
For count models, with conditional mean restricted to 
be positive, the effect is multiplicative in the conditional 
mean, rather than additive (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013), 
then:
μjt ≡ Ε[yjt|xjt,αj] = αjλjt = αjexp(x'j β),j = 1,,n,t = 1,…,T,    [6]
where the last equality specifies an exponential 
functional form, and the intercept is merged into αj, 
consequently it is now not included in the regressors xjt. 
The model can thus also be expressed as:
                             μjt ≡ exp(δj + x'jt β)                           [7]
where δj = lnαj. For the usual case of an exponential 
conditional mean, the individual effect can be interpreted 
both as a multiplicative effect and an intercept shifter.
Including the fixed effects in the model allows us 
to account for multilateral resistance (Feenstra, 2004), 
thus avoiding bias. Another issue deriving from the 
log-linearized model estimated by OLS is that the 
interpretation of coefficients as elasticities could be highly 
misleading in the presence of heteroskedasticity. We 
addressed this issues estimating Eq. [5] both with OLS 
and a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) 
estimator, originally proposed by Silva & Tenreyro (2006). 
The PPML estimator has been widely adopted in recent 
agro-food studies (Jayasinghe et al., 2010; Raimondi & 
Olper, 2011; Xiong & Beghin, 2012, Winchester et al., 
2012, Philippidis et al., 2013, Dal Bianco et al., 2016); the 
analysis consists of assuming an additive error in Eq. [1] 
and estimating the model by the PPML estimator. Another 
common problem of gravity estimation is the presence of 
zero as dependent variable: since the log-normal model 
cannot deal with zero-valued trade flows. Several solutions 
have been proposed. The most widely used are the 
Heckman two-stage sample selection, the Tobit and some 
variation of the Poisson model. However, since the dataset 
used did not contain any zero trade data, there was no need 
to test these estimators. According to that, we performed 
gravity estimation using OLS and PPML estimators. 
Estimations were made through STATA 12 software, both 
were performed using robust standard errors. Estimation 
results are reported in the following section.
Data
To evaluate the impact of the main variables 
commonly used in a gravity equation, as well as the 
influence of customs duties on bottled wine exports, a 
dataset was compiled including all the main Argentinean 
trade partners for the period 1997-201011. The dataset 
represents 90.4% of Argentinean bottled wine exports 
in the considered period, with a coverage ratio higher 
than 85% in every year.
The dataset for our model was compiled from multiple 
sources. Data on export values was retrieved from 
11 The group of 23 countries comprises Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru, United Kingdom, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, Uruguay.
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the Global Trade Atlas12 (GTA) at eight-digit level of 
Harmonized System (HS) of Classification. Tariff barriers 
were retrieved from the WTO Tariff Analysis Online 
Database, World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) 
database and national customs offices. Geographical 
distance between Argentina and the importer partner 
was collected from the Centre d’Études Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) gravity dataset, 
which calculates distance between countries considering 
the 25 most populated cities of each country, then weighted 
by the share of the city in the overall country population 
(Mayer & Zignago, 2011). Share of a common official 
language was obtained from the CEPII dataset. GDP 
was retrieved from the World Bank, and it is estimated 
in purchasing parity power terms at current prices (PPP 
GDP)13. Lastly, wine production of the importer country 
comes from the Organisation Internationale de la Vigne 
et du Vin (OIV) statistical database (StatOIV Extracts). 
All information was retrieved for the period 1997-2010. 
Tariff barriers were calculated basing on the MFN 
tariffs, chosen as reference of the national tariff levels, 
then adjusted according to the duty defined by FTAs, if 
any14. If the importer applies a specific tariff, this has 
been converted into an ad valorem equivalent (AVE) 
making use of the average import price as reference. 
For this estimation, the most widely used methodology 
consists of estimating a weighted average for each 
product category (e.g. HS 6) using the share of the single 
products (HS8). This approach has been criticized for 
its endogeneity (Anderson & Neary, 2003; Bouët et al., 
2008) and solutions include using world import data for 
weighting (Leamer, 1974) or a representative sample of 
countries’ import data (Bouët et al., 2008). Cipollina & 
Salvatici (2008) suggest using the average tariff of the 
last three years with an obvious problem of tariff ups 
and downs. As suggested by Anderson & Neary (2003), 
Bouët et al. (2008) and Cipollina & Salvatici (2008), in 
this study the median of the tariffs at HS 8 digit level 
has been used, since this approach allows the influence 
of tariff peaks to be minimized.
Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the analysis. 
Results
The results obtained with OLS15 and PPML16 estimators 
are reported in Table 6. All coefficients present the 
expected sign, when statistically significant. OLS results 
indicate that, as expected, the greater the physical distance 
between countries, the lower the trade flows. Indeed, 
according to the coefficient, an increase in distance of 
1% leads to a decrease in trade of 1.35%. The magnitude 
of this coefficient is slightly higher than what is found 
in the recent literature on both agricultural products and 
wine export (Dascal et al., 2002; Disdier & Head, 2008; 
Dal Bianco et al., 2016), and may suggest that transaction 
costs have a higher incidence for Argentinean wine. This 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics
Variable Unit Source[1] Type of variable Mean SD
[2] Minimum Maximum
Exports U$D FOB[3] GTA Continuous 10,038,279 21,900,000 3,024 223,292,290




Continuous 157,000,000 258,000,000 18,262,239 1,441,940,000





OIV Continuous 9,161 112 0 60,535
Tariff barrier Percentage WTO / 
WITS
Continuous 9.68 10.298 0 65
Language 1: same
0: different
CEPII Dummy 0.304 0.4608 0 1
[1]GTA: Global Trade Atlas (http://gtalogin.com/); World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/); CEPII: Centre d’Études Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (http://www.cepii.fr/); OIV: Organisation Internationale de la Vigne et du Vin (http://www.oiv.int/); 
WTO: World Trade Organization (https://www.wto.org/); WITS: World Integrated Trade Solution (http://wits.worldbank.org/). [2]SD: 
standard deviation. [3]FOB: Free on board. [4]PPP GDP: Purchasing power parity gross domestic product
12  www.gtalogin.com
13 PPP GDP refers to the gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the 
same purchasing power over GDP as the US$ has in the USA.
14 During the analyzed period Argentina signed (as a Mercosur member) just one free trade agreement with Chile, that entails a reduction in the Most 
FavouredNation(MFN) tariff since 2004.
15 Ordinary Least Squares.
16 Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood.
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could be due to the lesser reputation of Argentinean 
wines in comparison with those that come from more 
prestigious countries, such as EU countries and New 
Zealand (Anderson, 2004). Indeed, it is reasonable to 
expect that transaction costs – that are not directly linked 
to the product value – affect more the ordinary (low 
reputation) wines. The per capita GDP has a positive 
effect on wine flows in line with the literature, indicating 
that an increase in average income of 1% lead to a growth 
in wine imports of 1.12%. The importer’s volume of wine 
production showed a negative effect on trade, reducing 
wine imports each time the country increases its domestic 
production. However, the magnitude of its coefficient 
(0.457) indicates that distance has a three times bigger 
impact on wine flows than importer’s production volume. 
As expected, tariffs have a negative impact on trade, 
quite similar to the impact of importer’s production. 
Tariffs impact (-0.454) is similar to the one found in 
other studies on wine exports (Raimondi & Olper, 2011; 
Dal Bianco et al., 2016), and it can be expected that the 
national tax on exported wine exerts the same friction 
on trade. Lastly, in contrast with previous studies on the 
wine trade using the gravity equation (Seccia et al., 2009; 
Dascal et al., 2002; Dal Bianco et al., 2016), the language 
between partners is not statistically significant. This can 
probably be explained by the long-term expertise of 
Argentinean exporters in dealing in languages different 
than Spanish. Another possible explanation is related to 
the fact that, in the USA – the main import market for 
Argentinean wine – a high percentage of the population 
speak Spanish, although it is not an official language.
The results of the OLS estimation are then confirmed 
through the PPML model. As expected, since the OLS 
model tends to overestimate the role of distance and GDP 
(Silva & Tenreyro, 2006), the coefficients’ magnitude of 
these two variables are slightly lower in the PPML model. 
The greatest impact on the wine trade corresponds to 
variations in distance, followed by the importer’s wine 
production. With this estimator, the impact of tariff barriers 
is greater than in the OLS regression and its coefficient 
is twice the importer’s production coefficient. The ever-
increasing interest in diversity, especially true for the wine 
industry, can help to explain this reduced effect of national 
production. In other words, even if the home country 
increases its wine production, consumers will still look 
for and buy foreign wines. Instead, an increase in tariff 
barriers, with the consequent increase in retail prices, 
will definitely have a negative impact on sales and trade. 
Another difference in the PPML model is the impact of 
shared-language. In this model, if countries have the same 
language, the wine trade marginally increases. As this 
increase is absolutely minor we confirm our hypothesis 
of Argentinean wineries’ expertise in world markets 
serving as a bridge for exporting to non-Spanish speaking 
countries.
Discussion
The geography of world wine consumption has been 
changing in the last decades, with a reduction in the 
wine consumption gap (per capita) among countries. 
The consequence is that nowadays almost half the wine 
produced is exported, depicting international trade as a 
defining characteristic of the wine sector. In this study we 
assessed Argentinean exports of bottled wine in the period 
1997-2010 through a gravity model. As predicted, our 
results show that wine flows can basically be explained by 
the importing countries’ economic size and trade policies. 
The general economic performance of each country, 
measured by the per capita GDP, was found to have a direct 
and positive impact on wine imports. This result confirms 
previous findings and gives useful information for 
wineries, private and public agencies, which should focus 
their commercial and political efforts in those countries 
showing a positive growing economic trend. Domestic 
Table 6. Model estimates
Variable
OLS[1] PPML[2]
β p-value β p-value
Distance - 1.352*** 0.000 - 1.221*** 0.000
PPP GDP 1.119*** 0.000 1.056*** 0.000
Importer wine production - 0.457*** 0.000 - 0.322*** 0.000
Tariff - 0.454*** 0.000 - 0.678*** 0.000
Language 0.448 0.875 0.012*** 0.000
Constant 0.397 0.863 0.952*** 0.000
[1]R2 (ordinary least squares, OLS): 0.4979. [2]Pseudo R2 (Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood, PPML): 0.7172
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wine production – in terms of volume – also seems to 
influence the wine trade, even if this impact is far from 
being strong. This can be explained by the export growth 
that occurred in the last decades, which made wine one of 
the most globalized products in the world (Anderson & 
Nelgen, 2011). Consumers are nowadays used to buying 
and enjoying wines from different countries, often being 
desirous to taste new type of wines. Thus, it seems that 
an increase in the domestic supply can only partly affect 
demand for foreign wines. Even if these two variables – 
GDP and domestic wine production – have been identified 
as central in influencing trade, the high impact of tariffs 
suggests that the greatest efforts should be made in trade 
policy, at both national and supranational level. Since 
the weighted average import duty of Argentinean wine 
was 3.63% in 2010, our results suggest that the complete 
removal of customs duties would lead to a 2.46% increase 
in Argentinean bottled wine exports (according to PPML 
coefficient), considering the market share of importing 
countries as stable. The increasing importance of China 
as a new market – with a high tariff on imported wine – 
suggests that in the future the negative effect of customs 
duty on Argentinean exports could be even stronger. 
International negotiations over tariff barriers are thus 
essential for the growth of Argentinean wine exports. 
The Mercosur membership has probably contributed to 
the growth of Argentinean wine exports to other Latin 
American countries, but it may be counter-productive in a 
global scenario. The lack of free trade agreements with the 
main wine markets (EU, North America and Asia) may 
represent an important weakness for Argentinean wineries, 
especially when these are compared with Chilean, 
European or Australian ones. In addition, Argentina has 
a national tax of 5% on wine exports. Its effect was not 
evaluated through a gravity equation since its level has 
remained stable over the analyzed period. Despite being 
without any theoretical foundation, it is reasonable to 
expect the impact of this national tax as equivalent to that 
of an import duty. According to this, applying the same 
PPML coefficient found for import duty, it is expected 
to produce an export reduction of 3.39%. Indeed, since 
national tax is higher than the AVE average of import 
tariffs, Argentinean exports are likely to be more penalized 
by national policy than import duties. All in all, empirical 
results suggest that a pro-trade Mercosur and Argentinean 
foreign policy could strongly influence wine exports. 
Sales could grow up to 5.85%, which corresponds to an 
additional turnover of 47.8 million US$ per year. Our 
results seem to be in line with those provided by Sanjuán & 
Resano (2015), who estimated, for beverages and tobacco 
products, an export increase of 7.8% from Mercosur to the 
EU, after tariffs removal. 
This research is not exempt from future improvement. 
In particular, we did not assess the impact of non-tariff 
barriers, the importance of which is growing strongly 
(Disdier et al., 2008). However, we can expect similar 
or stronger results than those found for tariff-barriers. 
Other explanatory variables that may be assessed are 
exchange rate volatility and foreign direct investments. 
The first generates uncertainty and leads to a decrease in 
foreign trade when traders are risk adverse (Cho et al., 
2002), while the second improves economic growth and 
competitiveness (Borensztein et al., 1998). In a wine 
industry like the Argentinean one, driven by a relative 
small number of big companies and characterized by 
a high volatility of Argentineas peso, the inclusion of 
these regressors could be important to explicate export 
dynamics.
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